The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry by Sir John Chilcot was published on 6 July 2016.


The inquiry was announced on 15 June 2009 by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, with the objective of outlining the UK’s involvement in the 2003 Iraq War and the lessons to be learned from it. The report spans almost a decade of UK government policy decisions between 2001 and 2009, including the background to the decision to go to war, whether troops were properly prepared, how the conflict was conducted and what planning there was for its aftermath. The report comprises of 12 Volumes and 2.6 million words.

The report found:
* that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before all peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. In March 2003, there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein.

* Calculations about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s Weapons of mass destruction were presented with a certainty that was not justified. The decision to go into Iraq was based on flawed intelligence assessments.

* The then prime Minister Mr Tony Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq. It said that is important to ensure that civilian and military arms of government are properly equipped, and in future, all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with rigour.

* that the consequences of the invasion were underestimated and planning for post-invasion of Iraq were “wholly inadequate”

The executive summary and the full report can be found here: